Distracted Driver Summit September 29, 2017






Captain Jerry L. Davis Virginia State Police Bureau of Criminal Investigation – Wytheville Field Office

Autonomous Vehicles and the Impact on Law Enforcement


What is it? Autonomous vs Connected technology Regulation Liability / Insurance Cyber concerns Questions








| \triangle | \$ | 6 | | |
|--|---|---|---|---|
| SAFETY | COST | HEALTH | TIME | ENV |
| Could save more than 30,000 lives annually | Insurance costs reduced or eliminated Minimize the risk of traffic fines | Facilitates personal independence and mobility for physio- logically & mid cog- nitive limitations. Reduction in ER visite, hospitaliza- tions | Less wrecks = less traffic con- gestion, saving time | Reduction in heav safety features, crumple zones, and airbags — Lighter weight; lowers fuel consumption and emissions |
| Prevents accidents during unanticipated health issues: heart attack, seizure, stroke, etc. | | | | |
| Impaired drivers less of a danger to others | | | | |























LEVELS OF AUTONOMY NHTSA

| Level 0 | The human driver is in complete control of all functions of the car |
|---------|---|
| Level 1 | One function is automated |
| Level 2 | More than one function is automated at the same time, but the driver remains attentive |
| Level 3 | Driving functions are sufficiently automated - the driver can safely engage in other activities |
| Level 4 | The car is self-driving - no human driver required |

LEVELS OF AUTONOMY Society of Automotive Engineers SAE

Level 0 – No Automations: The full-time performance by the human driver of all aspects of the dynamic driving task, even when enhanced by warning or intervention systems Level 1 – Driver Assistances; The driving mode-specific execution by a driver assistance system of eithers steering or acceleration/deceleration using information about the driving environment and with the expectation that the human driver performs all remaining aspects of the dynamic and with the expectation that the human driver performs all remaining aspects of the dynamic and with the expectation that the human driver performs all remaining aspects of the dynamic and with the expectation that the human driver performs all remaining aspects of the dynamic and with the expectation that the human driver performs all remaining aspects of the dynamic and with the expectation that the human driver performs all remaining aspects of the dynamic and with the expectation that the human driver performs all remaining aspects of the dynamic and by the dynamic a driving task

Level 2 - Cartel Automation: The driving mode-specific execution by one or more driver assistance systems of both steering and acceleration/deceleration using information about the driving environment and with the expectation that the human driver performs all remaining aspects of the dynamic driving task

aspects of the dynamic driving task Level 3 – Conditional Automators: The driving mode-specific performance by an Automated Driving System of all aspects of the dynamic driving task with the expectation that the human driver will respond appropriately to a request to intervene Level 4 – tild Automations: The driving mode-specific performance by an Automated Driving System of all aspects of the dynamic driving task, even if a human driver does not respond appropriately to a request to intervene Level 5 – tild Automations: The full-time performance by an Automated Driving System of all aspects of the dynamic driving task under all roadway and environmental conditions that can be managed by a human driver.


nanaged by a human drive

PLATOONING





NHTSA rules that AI can be sole driver of Google's self-driving cars Highway Administration ruling means steering wheel, pedals not needed.

















Connected Vehicle Environment



























Basic Safety Message

GPS Position


Speed Acceleration Heading


Vehicle Control Information

Brake Status Steering Wheel Angle Path History Path Prediction

Vehicle Information is autonomous and No PII included Security System

Transmitted every tenth of a second and contains:





Output States Department of Transportation

Office of the Assistant Secretary for Research and Technology Intelligent Transportation Systems Joint Program Office




Research Areas

Accelerating Deployment Automation Connected Vehicles Emerging Capabilities Enterprise Data Interoperability


Liability / Insurance

What happens when Technology fails???



Fatal Crash May 7, 2016













On June 28, 2016, NHTSA opened PE16-007 to

"examine the design and performance of any automated driving systems in use at the time of the crash.

NHTSA's examination did not identify any defects in the design or performance of the AEB or Autopilot systems of the subject vehicles nor any incidents in which the systems did not perform as designed.

NTSB Press Release

National Transportation Safety Board Office of Public Affairs Driver Errors, Overreliance on Automation, Lack of Safeguards, Led to Fatal Tesla Crash 9/12/2017

WASHINGTON (Sept. 12, 2017) — The National Transportation Safety Board

determined Tuesday that a truck driver's failure to yield the right of way and a car driver's inattention due to overreliance on vehicle automation are the probable cause of the fatal May 7, 2016, crash near Williston, Florida.

NTSB Findings September 12, 2017

9. The way that the Tesla Autopilot system monitored and responded to the driver's interaction with the steering wheel was not an effective method of ensuring driver engagement.

10. Without the manufacturer's involvement, vehicle performance data associated with highly automated systems on vehicles involved in crashes cannot be independently analyzed or verified.

11. A standardized set of retrievable data is needed to enable independent assessment of automated vehicle safety and to foster automation system improvements.

INSURANCE JOURNAL

Tesla Introduces 'Substantial Improvements' to Autopilot By <u>Dana Hull</u> | September 12, 2016

Radar images vs. optical camera images

Positive control when Driver ignores warnings

















"What" do we need to do as public safety professionals to reduce the risks of a cyber attack?

"What" training protocols do we need in place to make certain our personnel can identify a cyber attack if/when it occurs?

"Whete" practices do we need to add to our personnel's existing safety vehicle checks? Virginia State Police Cybersecurity Requirements

ASSESS THE POSSIBILITY OF CYBER-ATTACK.

ENSURE THE SECURITY OF POLICE VEHICLE FLEETS.


DEVELOP A FORENSIC CAPABILITY TO EXAMINE AND ANALYZE A VEHICLE AT THE SCENE OF AN INCIDENT.

Project Phases - 90 Days

- Phase I Assessment / Study
- Phase II Attacks
- Phase III Solutions / Forensics
- Phase IV Documentation











| VEHICLE ATTACK | <u>ACTION</u> | CONSEQUENCE |
|--|---------------------------|---|
| Uncontrolled acceleration to limit | Loss of control | Potential for accident/injury/death to Trooper or civilians |
| Disengagement of brakes | Loss of control | Potential for accident/injury/death to Trooper or civilians |
| Asymmetrical braking | Loss of control | Potential for accident/injury/death to Trooper or civilians |
| Deployment of airbag at speed | Loss of control | Potential for accident/injury/death to Trooper or civilians |
| Cancellation of all lighting (external & internal) at night | Loss of control | Potential for accident/injury/death to Trooper or civilians |
| Transmission operation altered | Trooper Stops vehicle | Vehicle removed from service, inability to answer calls |
| Alter RPM,Throttle, Timing settings | Trooper Stops vehicle | Inability to answer calls for service, vehicle submitted for maintenance |
| Disengage Electronic Stability Control | Trooper Stops vehicle | Inability to answer calls for service, vehicle submitted for maintenance |
| Disengage ABS system | Warning Light illuminated | No action required immediately, submitted for service |
| Shutoff engine no restart | Vehicle stops | Vehicle towed for service, inability to answer calls |
| Prevent engine from turning off or starting | None | Vehicle removed from service, inability to answer calls |

| VEHICLE ATTACK | ACTION | CONSEQUENCE |
|--|-----------------------------|---|
| Instrument panel: Falsify readings | Trooper Stops vehicle | No traffic enforcement activity, removed from service |
| Door Locks activated continuously | None | Inability to answer calls for service, vehicle submitted for maintenance |
| Unlock Doors | Attempt to secure vehicle | Theft of firearms, radio, and other equipment |
| Unlock Trunk | Attempt to secure vehicle | Theft of firearms, radio, and other equipment |
| Lower windows | Attempt to secure vehicle | Theft of property, possible damage from elements |
| Horn Blows continuously | Remove vehicle from service | Inability to answer calls for service, vehicle submitted for maintenance |
| Heat / Air conditioning activated continuously | Remove vehicle from service | Inability to answer calls for service, vehicle submitted for maintenance |
| Car Radio On with increase volume | Remove vehicle from service | Inability to answer calls for service, vehicle submitted for maintenance |
| Wiper / Washer activated | Remove vehicle from service | Inability to answer calls for service, vehicle submitted for maintenance |
| Wiping Code | None | No Forensic Investigation capability |



Recommendations

- Public Safety personnel should currently receive annual training on cyber awareness.
- Cyber awareness should now include physical systems – police cars, bomb robots, UAV's, GPS, LPR's, radio systems, body cams, etc....

Recommendations cont.

- Agency Managers should review / formulate policy for physical inspections of external and internal areas of police vehicles (prior to duty, return from maintenance from 3rd party vendors)
- Inspect OBD-II port beneath dash, any device attached should be treated as suspicious.
 Vehicle removed from service until cleared.

Recommendations cont.

- IACP currently in preliminary stages of developing a checklist for use by officers as a general guideline for cybersecurity best practices for physical systems.
- Development of lesson plans and training of personnel during initial and Inservice training to generate cyber awareness.

Recommendations cont.

- The "Cyber Crime Checklist for Police Chiefs" by IACP used as baseline reference tool. Obtained through the IACP Cyber Center.
- All agencies should ensure cybersecurity matters are reflected in their public safety mission requirements, and appropriate personnel are designated to maintain SME in the area.

Recommendations cont.

- The Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE) has published Standard J3061;
 - "Cybersecurity Guidebook for Cyber-Physical Systems"

This guide addresses cybersecurity threats and identifies minimum standards necessary to secure vehicle systems.

Recommendations cont.

- Participate in the DHS Government Vehicle Cybersecurity Steering Committee. Bi-monthly teleconferences to develop actionable information on cyber issues for vehicles operated by governmental entities.
- Review existing criminal statutes for applicability to physical systems.

Recommendations cont.

- Agencies should partner with the automotive industry, public / private cybersecurity companies, and academia to further research and development.
- A critical need is for forensic capability at the scene of an incident for data extraction and analysis.
- New policy creation regarding cybersecurity.

Recommendations cont.

- Consider reallocation of current patrol assignments to community policing / emergency response roles
- How will reduction in revenue impact services?
- Technical vs. Tactical skills
- Use of technology as a force multiplier

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